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Article 3

Letters.
To the Editor:
In the May, 1974 issue of Linacre
Quarterly there appeared an article
by Gerard P. J. Griffin, M.D. entitled
"Catholic Physicians and the Directives for Catholic Health Facilities."
It struck me as I read the article that
it seemed that the author was interpreting the 1971 Directives as
"Directives for Individual Practicing
Physicians," and in at least one instance, "Directives for Married Couples." In fact, the title of the document
is "Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Facilities."
Some things may be good for and
indicated in the case of an individual
person. Sometimes these same things,
if adopted as an operational institutional policy may ultimately destroy
what the institution was set up to accomplish. There cannot be an undifferentiated transition from an individual
application to an organizational application, or vice versa. Failure to
r ealize this and lack of sophistication
in the organizational sciences seem to
be at the root of confusion for many
who study and analyze the Directives.
Sincerely,
Sister Rebecca, S.S.M.
Executive Director
St. Mary's Hospital Medical Center
Madison, Wisconsin

acts are involved in his example, and
that his "indirectly voluntary" intention is a futile attempt to unify them
into one.
If two shipwrecked sailors were
faced with a single lifejacket, the
weaker would not be justified in shooting the other to death, even though
that were the only means of obtaining
the jacket and thereby of saving his
own life'. Yet, Dr. May seems to be
justifying such a position.
His analogy with self-defense appears inadequate, since in morally
justifiable self-defense there is an additional factor, namely the unjust aggression.
It is not evident that the fetus is
an aggressor in any sense of the word.
The sometimes postulated "material
aggressor" is no longer a realistic role
to be played by any fetus. It should
be kept in mind by moralists that, in
light of modern obstetrical practice,
there are no longer any valid merucal
inrucations for a direct attack upon the
fetus. There continue to exist only
situations covered in cases traditionally exemplified by the cancerous uterus,
ectopic pregnancy, etc., all of which
provide for clear-cut, indirect intention
toward the cessation of the fetal life.
Sincerely yours,
Rev. Edw, Robinson, O.P.
Rogers Memorial Hospital
Rogers, Arkansas 72756
The following is Dr.
sponse.

May's

re-

Dear Father Robinson:
To the Editor:
It is difficult to understand Dr.
May's justification (Feb. 1974) for
directly attacking a fetus in the process of saving the mother's life. His
"indirectly voluntary" killing of the
fetus seems factious, in light of the fact
that the mean,s chosen to save the
mother's life is the killing of the fetus,
which would seem to require a direct
intention. It is quite possible that two
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The editors of The Linacre Quarterly have forwarded to me a copy of
your letter of June 23 commenting
on a section of my article on abortion.
I appreciate your concern, and I hope
that in this letter I will be able to
clarify my position.
First let me state that if the analysis
I offered would logically require me
to justifying one shipwrecked sailor to
shoot another to death so that he could
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thereby save his own life, then the
analysis offered is definitely false.
Second let me say that I firmly believe that direct abortion . is a wrongful activity, one in which human
beings ought not to engage .
I suppose the difficulty arises when
we seek to determine precisely what
is meant by "direct abortion ," that is
an activity that must be regarded, as
a moral or human act, as an act of
fetic ide. This is an activity that is
morally wrong and cannot be justified
on the grounds of good consequences.
My point is that at times one may
perform an act that does , in fact, bring
about the death of a fetus , and does
so directly in a physical sense, and
not take on as part of his moral iden tity the indentity of a feticider because the act itself is not truthfully
to be described as an act of feticide.
Why not? Because the thrust of the
action itself - its finis operis in an
older terminology, its own teleology is not directed against the life of the
fetus but is rather directed of its own
inner thrust toward removing a force
threatening the life of the mother. The
means involved is not the d eath of the
fetus but rather a human surgical activity ordered both of itself and by the
agent toward saving the life of the
mother, although it is foreseen that
t he fetus will die as a res ult of the
action. What the action do es is twofold: it saves the mother and leads
to the death of the fetus. What the
action says - its meaning or significance or intelligibility as a human act
- is performing the only action possible to save the life of the mother. Perhaps an analogy will help. Suppose
that a doctor is amputating the leg
of a person afflicted with bone cancer.
This act of amputation is , in a physical sense, directly mutilating that person , but it is not, morally speaking,
an act of mutilation , nOr is the doctor
taking on the identity of a mutilator
in doing it. His action does two things :
it mutilates the person whose leg is
amputated and likew ise saves his life ;
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his action says that the doctor is performing the only surgical operation
possible to save that person's life,
while foreseeing that the person will
be mutilated as a result of the activity.
One shipwrecked sailor may not
rightfully shoot another in order to
get the one life· preserver that can
save his own life because his act is
an act of killing. The act itself is targeted in and of itself on the death of
the other sailor, and the means that he
takes to save his own life is an act of
killing.
Even in unjust aggression one cannot rightfully intend the death of an
assailant - if the intent of the agent
is to kill the aggressor, if that is what
he is setting out to do through his
act, the action is no longer an act of
self-defense or of defense of another
but is now an act of killing. I think
that a careful examination of Summa
Theologiae II-II, 64, 7, will bear out
this analysis.
In the article I indicated that the
position I took was influenced greatly
by studying the writings of Germain
Grisez and Paul Ramsey, as well as
St. Thomas in the article cited, and
J. Glenn Gray in his book The Warriors (in particular, pp. 51-55). I think
that if you read this material and reflect on the position set forth in the
article, you might better see what I am
trying to say. It is morally wrong for
a human being to kill other human
beings directly , that is, to perform actions that inevitably mean that he is
taking on as part of his moral identity
the identity of a killer, of a doer of a
deed that is in and of itself targeted on
the death of other humans. If the type
of abortion that I seek to justify in my
essay is in truth an act of this kind ,
then it is an act that a human being
ought not to perform. I believe, however, and I hope that I have been able
to explain why, that some actions that
do in fact bring about the death of a
fetus, are not acts of killing, acts of
feticide. They are no more acts of
feticide than are actions leading to the
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death of a fetus when a cancerous
uterus or ectopic pregnancy is removed, although in all of these the
death of the fetus is foreseen and is
physically direct.
To summarize my position. An act
that will issue in the death of a fetus
is morally justifiable only when there
is a proportionate good to be achieved
and the agent does not directly, that
is, properly intend the death of the
fetus and does not do so because the
action that he is performing is of itself
not directly targeted on the life of the
fetus but rather on saving the life of
the mother.

I hope that this letter may help to
clarify my position. I realize that this
position may be erroneous, although I
believe that it is true. But I repeat:
if it is true that the type of action
that I justify is directly abortive in
the moral sense, then this is a type of
action that simply cannot be justified,
and it cannot be justified because it is
an act that inevitably requires one to
take on as part of his moral identity
the identity of a feticider, a killer of
fetuses.

Sincerely,
William E. May
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